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SELECTING CAPITAL JURORS UNCOMMONLY WELLING

To CONDEMN A MAN To DIE: LOWER COURTS'
CONTRADICTORY READINGS OF Wainwright v. Witt
AND Morgan v. Illinois
John Holdridge*
This article will explore the conflicting legal standards governing the
"death/life qualification" component of voir dire in capital cases. By death/life
qualification, I mean the questioning of prospective jurors regarding both their
willingness to consider the imposition of a death sentence and their willingness
to consider the imposition of a life sentence. As will be demonstrated, this law is
a farrago of contradictory decisions (many by the same courts) that virtually
guarantees the selection of jurors uncommonly willing to sentence a capital
defendant to death. The issues addressed in this Article are in urgent need of resolution by the United States Supreme Court.
This Article begins with an introduction that discusses the relevant United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence. It proceeds to set forth the conflicting
approaches taken by lower courts to the legal standards governing the death/life
qualification component of voir dire in capital cases, particularly with respect to
whether rulings on challenges for cause of prospective jurors should be based
solely on their views of capital punishment in the abstract or also on their views
of the appropriateness of a particular sentence under the facts of the case to be
tried. The Article argues that recent lower-court decisions have used two contradictory standards: while lower courts have approved prosecution challenges to
prospective jurors based on their willingness to impose a death sentence under
the facts of the case to be tried, lower courts have refused to approve defense
challenges to prospective jurors based on their willingness to impose a life sentence under the facts of the case to be tried. The Article argues that this double
standard is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court decisions and produces juries unfairly in favor of death sentences. The Article concludes by calling upon the United States Supreme Court to address the issues that it explores.
I. INTRODUCTION

This introduction will address two areas of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence pertinent to the subject of this Article. First, it will discuss the
Court's decisions setting forth the constitutional requirements of a capital punishment scheme. Second, the introduction will explore the Court's decisions
governing the death/life qualification component of the voir dire of capital
jurors. In essence, these decisions instruct that the parties may challenge for
* B.A., Lawrence University, 1977; J.D., New York University, 1988. John Holdridge is the director of the
Mississippi and Louisiana Capital Trial Assistance Project, New Orleans.
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cause capital jurors who do not manifest a willingness to follow their state's capital punishment scheme (i.e., to "follow the law"), including a fair consideration
of the penalties authorized by the scheme.
A. The ConstitutionalRequirements of a CapitalPunishmentStatutory Scheme.
In its landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposition of capital
punishment when "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."1 Four years later,
the Court held that the death penalty may be constitutionally imposed, but only if
"the sentencing body's discretion [is] suitably directed and limited."2
Specifically, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia held that capital punishment schemes
must limit the sentencing body's discretion by narrowing the class of defendants
statutorily eligible for the death penalty through aggravating circumstances.3
Furthermore, the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina held that capital punishment schemes must require the sentencing body to "consider[ ] the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense"
in determining the appropriate sentence.
Two years later, the Court stated that the reason the Eighth Amendment
requires the sentencer to consider the particular circumstances of the offense, and
character and record of the individual defendant, is that "an individualized [sentencing] decision is essential in capital cases."' In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court
struck down as unconstitutional Ohio's capital punishment scheme because it did
"not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now
hold to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases."6
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310-13 (1972) (White, J., concurring); id. at 306, 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (death penalty violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when "wantonly and ... freakishly
imposed"). Prior to Furman,the Eighth Amendment was understood to prohibit only: (1) certain types of punishments (i.e. torture) (Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)); and (2) punishments that are disproportionateto
the crimes being punished. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
3. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 (approving Georgia's use of statutory aggravating circumstances to narrow the
class of death-eligible defendants).
4. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. See also Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Tuilaepa v. California,
512 U.S. 967 (1994); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) ("the trial court's sentencing discretion is
guided and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of each individual homicide and individual
defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be imposed").
5. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). See also Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992) (capital punishment schemes must ensure defendant "receive[s] an individualized sentence"); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990) (defendant entitled to "individualized treatment").
6. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. The Court stated:
We recognize that, in noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not
on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes. The considerations that
account for the wide acceptance of sentences in noncapital cases surely cannot be thought less
important in capital cases. Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is
essential in capital cases.
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In Lockett and the numerous cases that have followed it,' the Court has held that
capital punishment schemes must permit defendants to offer all mitigating factors relevant to "the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense."8
The Court has held not only that a capital defendant must be permitted to offer
all relevant mitigating circumstances, but that "the sentencer [must] listen"-that
is, the sentencer must consider the mitigating circumstances when deciding the
appropriate sentence.' However, the Court has drawn a clear and important distinction between jurors' consideration of mitigation and the weight that they
assign it."0 Thus, although the Court has held that under the Eighth Amendment
jurors must consider mitigation, the Court has also held that it must be the "sentencer [who] determine[s] the weight to be given relevant mitigating circumstances."1
In addition, while the Court has declared unconstitutional capital punishment
schemes that mandate the death penalty for certain types of crimes, 2 the Court
has upheld schemes under which death is a mandatory punishment if the jury
makes certain findings that necessitate a consideration of mitigating evidence."'
B. The United States Supreme Court'sDecisions on the Death/Life
Qualification ofProspectiveJurorsDuring Voir Dire.
Any discussion of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing
the death/life qualification of capital jurors must begin, but not end, with the
7. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); see
also Zant v. Stephans, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) ("defendant's mental illness ... militate[s] in favor of a lesser
penalty" than death); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (defining mitigating circumstances as
"[c]ircumstances such as the youth of the offender, the absence of any prior conviction, the influence of drugs,
alcohol, or extreme emotional disturbance").
8. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
9. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319,
321, 327 (1988) (defendant has "'the right to have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence' (citation omitted); "'the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence"' (citation omitted); decision to
impose death penalty is "a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character and crime");
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987) ("State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion but must allow
it to consider any relevant information offered by the defendant").
10. Whether or not this distinction is a persuasive one is arguable. It might be that a prospective juror who
states that she will consider a mitigating circumstance is necessarily a juror who will accord it at least some
weight. On the other hand, it is by no means clear that a prospective juror who will accord a specific mitigating
circumstance some weight will be highly likely to vote for a life sentence after hearing about the facts and circumstances of the crime, the aggravating circumstances, and the character and background of the defendant.
11. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15. See also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 n.8 (1988) (it is in the
"jury's discretion [to] attach[] significance to the presence of mitigating circumstance[]"). And see Penry, 492
U.S. at 319 (jurors make "individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty").
12. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
13. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of death penalty statute under
which death is mandatory punishment if jury determines that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976).
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Court's seminal decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois." In Witherspoon, the Court
addressed whether and when the prosecution may challenge for cause prospective jurors because of their views against capital punishment." The Court held
that the prosecution may challenge for cause only prospective jurors who make
unmistakably clear that "they would automatically vote against the imposition of
the capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at
the trial of the case before them.""6 The Court further stated:
[V]eniremen... cannot be excluded for cause.., simply because they indicate
that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend
capital punishment. And a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in
advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the
case before him. The most that can be demanded of a veniremen in this regard
is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and
that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against
the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge
in the course of the proceedings."
The Court explained its decision by stating that "a State may not entrust the
determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to
return a verdict of death"-that is, a tribunal comprised only of jurors "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.""8
Soon after Witherspoon was handed down, the Court issued a summary decision in Jaggers v. Kentucky,"5 in which the Court reversed the holding of the
14. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon was decided prior to the Court's landmark
decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976), in
which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires special procedural
requirements in capital cases, including (almost certainly) a bifurcated capital sentencing hearing. Accordingly,
when Witherspoon was handed down, jurors decided both guilt and sentence at the same time. See H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, THE AMERiCAN JuRy, 435, 444, 448-49 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has issued
inconsistent pronouncements with respect to whether its holdings in Furman and Gregg affected its holding in
Witherspoon. In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), the Court applied the holding of Witherspoon to bifurcated capital proceedings. However, in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1985), the Court justified its
modification of the Witherspoon test based on its holdings in Furman and Gregg. The Court reasoned that
given the unfettered discretion of jurors prior to Furman, a juror at that time who was not unalterably opposed
to capital punishment was able to follow the law. The Court stated that in light of the limited and directed discretion ofjurors after Furman, that was no longer true. But in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 731 n.6 (1992),
the Court once again rejected the argument that Witherspoon 's principles do not apply to capital bifurcated proceedings. Although a full examination of this question is beyond the scope of this Article, it is significant that,
since Witt, the Court has held that jurors may be accorded unfettered discretion at a capital sentencing hearing.
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 975-80 (1994) (jurors at capital sentencing hearings may be accorded
unfettered discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate
penalty).
15. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 510. The decision in Witherspoon, like all of the Court's decisions addressing
death-qualification voir dire, was rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
reason is that the Court has held that capital defendants do not have a right under the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments to be sentenced by a jury but, if given a jury, it must be fair and impartial under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
16. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n.21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 521. See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182 (1986) (Witherspoon and Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980), "dealt with the special context of capital sentencing, where the range ofjury discretion necessarily gave rise to far greater concern over the possible effects of an 'imbalanced' jury").
19. Jaggers v. Kentucky, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
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Kentucky Supreme Court in Jaggers v. Commonwealth, which had upheld the
exclusion of prospective jurors because they "stated that their scruples would
2
prevent imposition of a death sentence by them 'in this case.'
In Adams v. Texas, the Court purported to follow the holding in Witherspoon
when it reversed the appellant's death sentence because of the improper exclusion for cause of prospective jurors based on their views against capital punishment. 21 However, instead of requiring that excludable prospective jurors make
unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment, the Court in Adams stated that the test was whether the
views of the jurors "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of
[their] duties as a juror in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath." 22
In Adams, the Court also stated that an "inability to deny or confirm any effect
whatsoever [of a prospective juror's views against capital punishment] is [not]
equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow
the Court's instructions and obey their oaths," and that Texas had improperly
allowed for the exclusion of jurors "whose only fault was .

.

. to acknowledge

honestly that they might or might not be affected" by the prospect of imposing a
death sentence.22
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court explicitly adopted Adams' modification of
Witherspoon, holding that the standard for juror exclusion is "whether the juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,"' and not whether the juror
made unmistakably clear that he would automatically vote against the death
penalty.24 Citing Adams v. Texas, in which the Court had commented that states
retain "a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who could follow their instructions and obey their oaths," 2 the Court in Witt held that, to be challengeable for
cause, prospective jurors need not be unalterably opposed to capital punishment,
regardless of the facts and circumstances that might develop at trial; rather, it is
sufficient if their opposition to capital punishment, regardless of the facts and
circumstances, would substantially impair their ability to apply the law.26
Accordingly, in Witt, the Court did not alter Witherspoon 's holding to the extent
that it framed the question of whether prospective jurors are challengeable for
cause in terms of their views of capital punishment in the abstract and not under
20. Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W2d 580, 585 (Ky. 1968).
21. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 50-51.
24. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,423 (1985).
25. Id. at 420 (citing Adams, 448 U.S. at 44).
26. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 n.5:
We adhere to the essential balance struck by the Witherspoon decision rendered in 1968 ... ; we
simply modify the test stated in Witherspoon "s footnote 21 to hold that the State may exclude from
capital sentencing juries that 'class' of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths.
The Court also held in Witt that the potential jurors' inability to serve need not be shown with unmistakable
clarity, as the Court had held in Witherspoon. Id. at 412.
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the facts of the case to be tried. That is, Witt did not modify the statement in
Witherspoon that
veniremen ... cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indicate that
there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital
punishment. And a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of
trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before
him."

In addition to holding that the prosecution may challenge for cause prospective
jurors who are unable to fairly consider the imposition of the death penalty, the
United States Supreme Court has held that, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the defense may challenge for cause prospective jurors
who will automatically vote for a death sentence regardless of the facts or circumstances that might develop at trial. In Ross v. Oklahoma, the United States
Supreme Court stated in dicta that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse for
cause a potential juror who stated that he would automatically vote for the death
penalty.2" In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court "reiterated [the] view" that it had
expressed in Ross, which the Court explained was rooted in its decision in Witt.29
In Morgan, the Court reversed the appellant's death sentence because the trial
court refused inquiry during voir dire of whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for a death sentence." The Court held that "[a] juror who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to
consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to."" The Court ruled that a trial court must excuse for cause
any "juror who . . . will automatically vote for the death penalty" as well as
"[a]ny juror to whom mitigating factors are ... irrelevant."32 The Court further
held that a defendant must be allowed to identify prospective jurors who have
"predetermined the terminating issue of his trial, that being whether to impose
the death penalty."3 3
27. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). The Court reiterated this holding in Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178 (1986) (prospective juror may be excluded for cause only if"he could not under
any circumstances recommend the death penalty").
28. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988). In Ross, although the Court discussed a prospective juror
who had stated that he would automatically vote for a death sentence, the Court used the Witt test, stating that
the prospective juror's views "would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and oath."'
29. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992). The Court stated that the holdings of "Witt and
Adams, the progeny of Witherspoon, [are] that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment,
regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause."
30. Id.
31. Id. at 729. See also Id. at 735 ("Any juror who would impose death regardlessof thefacts and circumstances of conviction cannotfollow the dictates of law.") (emphasis added); Id. ("[J]urors-whether they be
unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death penalty in every case-by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with law...") (emphasis added). In Morgan, the Court did not address whether
prospective jurors must be excused for cause if they deem the specific mitigating circumstances in the case to
be tried irrelevant to their sentencing decision, or whether trial courts must allow inquiry into that question.
32. Id. at 738-39. The Court further held that a trial court may not refuse a defendant's request for "direct
inquiry into this matter," even if "other questioning purports to assure the defendant a fair and impartial jury
about to follow the law."
33. Id. at 736.
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While the opinion in Morgan used the phrase "automatically vote for the death
penalty,"3 it is by no means clear that the Court intended to limit the breadth of
its holding only to prospective jurors who express unalterable opposition to a life
sentence.3" Certainly, the Morgan decision should be interpreted to extend to
prospective jurors who met the Witt standard and whose ability to fairly consider
a life sentence is substantially impaired, even if they do not manifest an unalterable opposition to a life sentence. This is so for a number of reasons. First, the
decision cites Ross with approval, and explains the Ross dicta as follows: "[T]he
trial court's failure to remove the juror for cause was constitutional error under
the standard enunciated in Witt.""a Second, the decision in Morgan itself relies
heavily upon the Witt holding.3" Third, the decision in Morgan states, "Illinois
has chosen to provide a capital defendant 12 jurors to decide his fate, and each of
these jurors must stand equally impartial in his or her ability to follow the law."38
Jurors who are substantially impaired in their ability to consider a life sentence
clearly do not stand impartial in their ability to follow the law. Fourth, it would
be logically insupportable to hold that prospective jurors whose ability to consider a death sentence is substantially impaired can be challenged for cause, but
prospective jurors whose ability to consider a life sentence is substantially
impaired cannot be challenged for cause.39
34. Numerous commentators have noted Morgan 's failure to "strike a perfect balance between 'life qualification' and 'death qualification."' See, e.g., John C. Belt, Morgan v. Illinois: The Right to Balance Capital
Sentencing Juries as to their Views on the Death Penalty is Finally Granted to Defendants, 24 N.M. L. REV.
145, 166 (1994).
35. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 750, n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
If, as the Court claims, this case truly involved "the reverse" of the principles established in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and the cases that followed it, ante, at 731, then it is
difficult to understand why petitioner would not be entitled to challenge, not just those jurors who
will "automatically" impose the death penalty, but also those whose sentiments on the subject are
sufficiently strong that their faithful service as jurors will be "substantiallyimpaired".... The
Court's failure to carry its premise to its logical conclusions suggests its awareness that the premise
is wrong.
Justice Scalia was right to suggest that the logical conclusion of the decision in Morgan is that the defense must
be allowed to challenge for cause prospective jurors whose ability to fairly consider a life sentence is substantially impaired. He was wrong, however, to suggest that the majority's refusal to explicitly enunciate this right
suggests that its premise was wrong. Rather, this refusal might best be explained by considering the facts of
Morgan. At trial, defense counsel did not ask that the prospective jurors be examined regarding whether their
ability to consider a life sentence was substantially impaired. Rather, trial counsel for the defense sought
unsuccessfully to ask them: "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the
death penalty no matter what the facts are?" Id. at 723. Accordingly, the limited question before the Court in
Morgan was whether a defendant is entitled to inquire whether prospective jurors will automatically vote for the
death penalty.
36. Id. at 728.
37. Id. at 728, 732.
38. Id. at 734, n.8.
39. But see United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 341 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added):
In a capital sentencing context, there is the right to challenge for cause a juror whose views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). The government has the right to challengefor cause those veniremen whose views in opposition to the death penalty will substantially impair their duty. Id.As a
corollary, the capital murder defendant has a right to challengefor cause anyjuror who will automatically votefor the death penalty in every case ....
See also infra notes 55, 61, 62.
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If a prospective juror who has substantial difficulty considering a vote for
death is biased, then certainly a prospective juror who has substantial difficulty
considering a vote for life is also biased. As the majority in Morgan stated, "due
process alone has long demanded that, if a jury is to be provided the defendant,
regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment requires it, the jury must stand
impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment."4
Thus, these decisions of the United States Supreme Court should be read to
hold that capital jurors who manifest an inability to follow their state's capital
punishment scheme, including fair consideration of the penalties authorized by
the scheme, are challengeable for cause. These decisions also suggest that the
judicial determination of whether or not such prospective jurors are challengeable for cause must be based on their views of capital punishment in the abstract,
and not under the facts of the case to be tried. Indeed, these decisions appear to
indicate that prospective jurors may not be challenged for cause because they are
unwilling to consider a particular penalty under the facts and circumstances of
the case to be tried.
II. LOWER COURTS HAVE ISSUED CONFLICTING DECISIONS AS TO WHEN
PROSPECTIVE JURORS CAN BE CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE.

As explained in the introduction, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court should be read to hold that prospective jurors cannot be excused for cause
if they are able to follow their state's capital punishment scheme, including fair
consideration of the penalties authorized by the scheme, and that the judicial
determination of whether the jurors are capable of following the scheme must be
made without regard to the prospective jurors' views of the appropriateness of a
particular penalty given the facts and aggravating and mitigating circumstances
of the case to be tried by them. However, lower courts have not consistently
41
interpreted the controlling precedent in this manner.
First, while lower courts have freely followed Witt and allowed the prosecution
to challenge for cause prospective jurors whose willingness to consider a death
sentence is substantially impaired, courts have been extraordinarily resistant to
allowing the defense to challenge for cause prospective jurors whose ability to
fairly consider a life sentence is substantially impaired. 2 These courts have read
40. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727.
41. The California Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has not decided
whether a juror who affirms only that he would automatically vote against death in the case before him can be
excluded for cause." People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 697 (Cal. 1983).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 152 E3d 381, 409 (5th Cir. 1998); Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 E3d 749,
758 (8th Cir. 1998); Gardner v. Norris, 949 E Supp. 1359, 1370 (E.D. Ark. 1996); State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d
1276, 1286, 1290 (La. 1998) ("[W]e do not find that Ms. Galloway expressed an unconditional willingness to
impose a death penalty under any and all circumstances.") ("After consideration of the application for rehearing, we choose to make abundantly clear that the standard by which we determine that potential juror Galloway
was not properly excludeable for cause was ...[whether she] 'will automatically vote the death penalty under
the factual circumstances of the case before [her]."') (citation omitted); State v. Trull, 509 S.E.2d 178 (N.C.
1998); State v. Williams, 679 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio 1997); State v. Lungren No. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL
346444, (Ohio App. 11 Dist. September 14, 1993); McCarty v. State, 977 P.2d 1116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998);
State v. Barone, 969 P.2d 1013 (Or. 1998).
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Morgan narrowly, as requiring only the exclusion of prospective jurors who will

automatically vote for the death penalty and not those whose ability to consider a
life sentence is substantially impaired.
Second, the lower courts (sometimes the same lower courts) have issued wildly
conflicting decisions with respect to whether prospective jurors are challengeable
for cause based on their willingness to impose a particular sentence in the case to
be tried (as opposed to in the abstract). Particularly in more recent decisions,
many courts read Witt broadly to permit the prosecution to challenge for cause
prospective jurors based on their willingness to impose a death sentence under

the facts of the case to be tried, but read Morgan narrowly to prohibit the defense
from challenging for cause prospective jurors based on their willingness to
impose a life sentence under the facts of the case to be tried.
What follows is an explication of these conflicting lower court decisions

addressing case-specific death/life qualification. For purposes of clarity, the
decisions are divided into different categories and subcategories and are considered in light of language from precedent of the United States Supreme Court.
One category of decisions (Category I) has held that neither the prosecution

nor the defense may ask prospective jurors case-specific questions during the
death/life qualification.
Court's decisions."'

3

This holding can be traced to language in many of the

Employing the same reasoning, another category of (mostly older) decisions
(Category II), while not necessarily prohibiting case-specific questioning during

voir dire,45 has held that neither the prosecution nor the defense may challenge
for cause prospective jurors based on their unwillingness to impose a particular
sentence in the case to be tried, particularly when it is the mitigating circumstances that preclude consideration of capital punishment. In Lewis v. State, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that six veniremen were improperly excluded
because they stated that they could not impose the death penalty on a sixteenyear-old defendant.4" The Court reasoned:
43. See, e.g., Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 485 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("[W]here the death penalty is a
possibility, the trial judge should examine the prospective jurors to ascertain whether any of them would clearly
vote either for or against the death penalty regardless of the evidence"), aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 886 (1991); Blankenship v. State, 365 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 1988) ("[N]either the defendant
nor the state has the right simply to outline the evidence and then ask a prospective juror his opinion of that evidence"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d 589 (Miss. 1968) (death/life qualification should be in the abstract and not refer to facts of case to be tried); State v. Yelverton, 434 S.E.2d 183, 188
(N.C. 1993) ("Jurors should not be asked what kind of verdict they would render under certain named circumstances"); State v. Bedford, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920 (Ohio 1988) (trial court properly refused to allow state and
defendant to ask case-specific questions during death/life qualification voir dire); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676,
682 (Okla. Crim. 1991) ("To permit such [case-specific] questioning would make voir dire an open forum for
discussion of any circumstances accompanying the murder, both mitigating and aggravating").
44. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) ("[A] prospective juror cannot be
expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before
him").
45. Some states allow case-specific questioning to ensure the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.
See, e.g., Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 755-56 (Miss. 1992); Hart v. State, 612 So. 2d 520 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992), aff'd 612 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1992).
46. Lewis v. State, 268 S.E.2d 915 (Ga. 1980).
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Veniremen who are irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote
against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might
emerge in the course of the trial, may be excluded for cause. But veniremen
who are not irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against
the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances "cannot be
excluded for cause simply because they indicate that there are some kinds of
cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment." [citing
Witherspoon]. A venireman cannot be excluded for cause simply because he
indicates that he would refuse to recommend capital punishment for a 16-yearold. [citation omitted] .... The jury must be allowed to consider mitigating
circumstances [citations omitted]. Age (youth) is a mitigating circumstance.
Yet here the state was permitted to strike for cause those veniremen who would
have given utmost consideration to the mitigating factor of the age of the appellant ....A simple illustration explains the problem. If the state were permitted
to exclude for cause those veniremen who said they could not impose the death
penalty upon a sixteen year old with no prior criminal record who was an
orphan, all veniremen who would consider that the mitigating circumstances
outweighed
the aggravating circumstances could be excluded by the state for
47
cause.
The reasoning of Category II decisions also would appear to be rooted in
Witherspoon's statement that "a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in
advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for [a particular] penalty in the
case before him."' In addition, the Eighth Amendment would appear to prohibit
the prosecution from challenging for cause prospective jurors who are unwilling
to impose a death sentence because of the mitigating circumstances of the case to
be tried. As stated in the introduction, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, the United States
47. Id. at 918-19. See also Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551,556 (1 th Cir. 1983):
[A potential juror's] refusal to impose a death sentence in this case stemmed from her determination
of the inappropriateness of such a penalty on the facts of this case rather than a general refusal to
impose the death penalty in any case. Certainly it would violate a criminal defendant's due process
fights were a court to dismiss a juror because of her refusal to impose the death penalty in a given
case.
People v. Pinholster, 824 P2d 571, 591-92 (Cal. 1992) (potential jurors may not be excluded for cause based on
their responses to case-specific questions regarding their willingness to impose particular penalty) (citing
People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 136 (Cal. 1990) ("The Witherspoon-Witt... voir dire seeks to determine only the
views of the prospective jurors about capital punishment in the abstract, to determine if any, because of opposition to the death penalty, would 'vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced at
trial"') (citations omitted)); Monserrate v. State, 271 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1971) (potential juror who could not
vote for death penalty for 16-year-old improperly excluded for cause); Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45, 54-55
(Miss. 1985) (trial court improperly granted challenge for cause of two jurors who were hesitant to impose
death penalty under facts of circumstantial evidence case); State v. Debler, 856 S.W2d 641, 646 (Mo. 1993)
("juror who under some of the hypothetical facts of the case would vote one way or the other is not subject to
disqualification for cause"); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 257 (N.J. 1987) (New Jersey allows case-specific
questions but "[j]urors must not be asked categorically to prejudge their willingness to impose the death penalty
in the case"); State v. Holland, 283 A.2d 897, 902 (N.J. 1971) (six jurors improperly excluded for cause because
they could not return death sentence against defendant who, while participating in felony murder, did not do
actual killing); Wilson v. State, 863 S.W2d 59, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (trial court erred in granting State's
challenge for cause of potential juror "because he could not answer the second issue solely based upon the circumstances of the offense before him").
48. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
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Supreme Court held that, under the Eighth Amendment, it must be the "sentencer
[who] determine[s] the weight to be given relevant mitigating circumstances."49
Category III decisions hold that the prosecution and the defense50 may challenge for cause prospective jurors who are willing to consider a particular penalty only in "impossible" or highly-limited circumstances.5 ' Their reasoning can
be traced to the Court's modification in Witt of its holding in Witherspoon.2 In
Witherspoon, the Court held that only prospective jurors who made unmistakably
clear that they were unalterably opposed to capital punishment regardless of the
facts and circumstances could be excluded for cause.53 In Witt, the Court ruled
that the standard for juror exclusion is "whether the juror's views would prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath."5 4 Category III decisions have reasoned that
the ability of prospective jurors to apply the law is substantially impaired when
they can vote for a particular penalty only in specific, highly unlikely scenarios,
or under "impossible circumstances."
Category IV decisions begin to more directly address case-specific questioning
of prospective jurors. These decisions deal with challenges for cause by both the
defense and the prosecution of prospective jurors who would automatically vote
for a particular penalty given the circumstances of the offense and/or the aggravating circumstances in the case to be tried. This category may be divided into
two subcategories: Subcategory IV(a) addresses defense challenges and
Subcategory IV(b) addresses prosecution challenges. Although a few decisions
from Louisiana in Subcategory IV(a) have held that the defense can challenge
for cause prospective jurors who are opposed to voting for a life sentence given
the circumstances of the offense and/or the aggravating circumstances in the case
49. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982). See also supra notes 9, 11.
50. The overwhelming majority of these cases involve challenges for cause by the prosecution of prospective jurors who stated that they would vote for a death sentence only in highly-limited circumstances. A few
cases use language that would apply to the defense.
51. See Riles v. McCotter, 799 E2d 947, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1986) (potential juror properly excluded when
that potential juror would vote life in any case where victim not brutally butchered); People v. Payton, 839 P.2d
1035, 1043 (Cal. 1992) (potential juror who could vote death only "in the most aggravated case you can imagine" properly excluded for cause); People v. Ganus, 594 N.E.2d 211, 215 (Ill. 1992) (potential juror properly
excluded for cause even though equivocated in response to defense counsel's unrealistic hypothetical of heinous
crime); Davis v. State, 487 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind. 1986) (potential jurors properly excused for cause when they
could only vote death in some extreme cases); Wiley v. State, 484 So. 2d 339, 344 (Miss. 1986) (potential juror
properly excluded for cause when he could consider death penalty only if his wife and three children were
killed); State v. Debler, 856 S.W2d 641, 646 (Mo. 1993) ("juror who would consider one of the two penalties
only under impossible circumstances is subject to disqualification"); State v. Jones, 749 S.W2d 356, 361 (Mo.
1988) (two potential jurors properly excluded for cause when one would require overwhelming evidence of
guilt to impose death and another would not vote for death if no eyewitnesses); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d
939, 975-76 (N.J. 1988) (juror who stated he would vote for life if any mitigating circumstances whatsoever,
properly excluded for cause); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987) (potential juror properly excluded for
cause because she could only impose death penalty if brutal death of child); Rojem v. State, 753 R2d 359, 36364 (Okla. 1988) (potential juror who could impose death only in certain extreme hypothetical situations suggested by defense counsel properly excluded for cause); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W2d 51, 62 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (potential juror properly excluded for cause when the potential juror could vote death penalty but "it
would have to be some case").
52. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
53. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
54. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
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to be tried,"5 most courts have held to the contrary 6 and, indeed, a large number
have held that the defense may not even ask case-specific questions under
Morgan. 7 On the other hand, the many decisions in Subcategory IV(b) have
held that the prosecution can challenge for cause prospective jurors who are
unalterably opposed to capital punishment given the circumstances of the offense
and/or the aggravating circumstances of the case to be tried. 5 These
Subcategory IV(b) decisions have reasoned that, because the law authorizes the
death penalty in the case to be tried, prospective jurors who cannot impose it in
that case are unable to apply the law. In addition to the language in Witt discussed above, these decisions have found support for their position in
Witherspoon 's statement that "[t]he most that can be demanded of a venireman in
this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state
law ...
Decisions in Category V address whether the prosecution and the defense may
challenge for cause prospective jurors whose willingness to vote for a particular
sentence is substantially impaired by the circumstances of the offense and/or the
aggravating circumstances of the case to be tried. Again, courts have refused to
permit the defense to challenge for cause prospective jurors whose willingness to
consider a life sentence is substantially impaired, on the ground that Morgan
55. See State v. Maxie, 653 So. 2d 526, 538 (La. 1995) (trial court erred in denying defendant's challenge
of prospective juror who would not consider life sentence because case involved rape and murder; "potential
juror who indicates that she will not consider a life sentence and will automatically vote for death penalty under
the factual circumstances of the case before her is subject to a challenge for cause by the defendant") (citing
Robertson v. State, 630 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (La. 1994) (same)); State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1184 (N.J.
1988) (juror who cannot credit mitigation if offense is a rape/murder cannot sit; "a juror who will not, or cannot, consider relevant mitigating evidence pertaining to the defendant because the crime involves rape and murder is 'substantially impaired' under the Adams- Witt test"); arguably, the decision in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
719 (1992), fits in Subcategory IV(a) given that the Court held that the defense had a right to question prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty in a contract killing and given that the
contract-nature of the killing was an aggravating circumstance. See Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also
infra at n. 82.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 698 So. 2d 189 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), aff'd, 698 So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1997);
1996); People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. 1995). Compare Sadler v.
People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290 (I11.
State, 977 S.W2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
57. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998) (and cases cited therein)
("Numerous courts have held Morgan-type questions objectionable when the question was predicated on facts
specific to the case at issue or upon speculation as to what facts may or may not be proven at trial").
58. See Antwine v. Delo, 54 E3d 1357, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1995) (proper to exclude for cause a potential
juror who "indicate[s] that only in a case like [the defendant's] could he not impose the death" penalty, even
though "the source" of the "bias" of the excluded juror "was not the death penalty in the abstract, or in some
irrelevant hypothetical case," but the specific facts of the case to be tried); United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d
1342, 1356 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (if
potential juror knows enough about case to say she could not consider imposition of death penalty, "she must be
excused"), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983); Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996) (prospective jurors
who could not consider death penalty in a circumstantial evidence case could be challenged for cause by the
prosecution); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 698 (Cal. 1983) ("We ... conclude that a court may properly
excuse a prospective juror who would automatically vote against the death penalty in the case before him,
regardless of his willingness to consider the death penalty in other cases"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984);
Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W2d 580, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968) ("[T]he jurors excused for cause.., stated
that their scruples would prevent imposition of a death sentence by them 'in this case."') rev 'dsub nom. Jaggers
v. Kentucky, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 938 (Miss. 1986) (prospective jurors who
stated that they could not consider death penalty for nontriggerman could be challenged for cause by the prosecution); Commonwealth v. Colson, 490 A.2d 811, 821 (Pa. 1985) (trial court did not err in excusing potential
juror for cause because "[tihe testimony indicated that the prospective juror could not vote for the death penalty
under the facts of the case and would not follow the court's instructions") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1140 (1986).
59. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
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requires only the exclusion of prospective jurors who will automatically vote for
the death penalty and not those whose ability to consider a life sentence is substantially impaired. Accordingly, there is only one case, again from Louisiana,
holding that the defense may challenge for cause prospective jurors whose ability
to consider a life sentence is substantially impaired, given the circumstances of
the offense and/or the aggravating circumstances of the case to be tried.6"
However, a number of decisions hold that the prosecution may challenge for
cause prospective jurors whose willingness to vote for a death sentence is substantially impaired by the specific circumstances of the offense and/or the aggravating circumstances of the case to be tried. 1 These decisions have wrongly construed Witt 's modification of Witherspoon's holding. In Witherspoon, the Court
held that veniremen could be excluded for cause only if they are unalterably
opposed to capital punishment, regardless of the facts and circumstances. 2 In
Witt, the Court held that, to be excused for cause, prospective jurors need not be
unalterably opposed to capital punishment, regardless of the facts and circumstances; rather, it is sufficient if their opposition to capital punishment, regardless of the facts and circumstances, would substantially impair their ability to
apply the law. 3 The mistake these decisions make is that, under Witt, it is not the
prospective jurors' willingness to impose a death sentence that must be substantially impaired, but their ability to apply the law.64 The decisions have failed to
explain what legal provisions prospective jurors are substantially impaired from
applying. All state capital punishment schemes allow (and, under the Eighth
Amendment, must allow) prospective jurors discretion to make a determination
of the appropriate sentence based on their reasoned moral response to the facts
and circumstances of the offense. 6
60. State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320, 324 and n.5 (La. 1996) ("If a prospective juror's inclination toward the
death penalty would substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties, a challenge for cause is warranted"). But see State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 1998) ("After consideration of the application for
rehearing, we choose to make abundantly clear that the standard by which we determine that potential juror
Galloway was not properly excludeable for cause was . . . [whether she] 'will automatically vote the death
penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before [her]."') (citation omitted).
61. See People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 410 n.16 (Cal. 1992) (dicta) ("[tihe question to be resolved under
WItherspoon and its progeny is whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the
juror's ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
893 (1992); Scales v. State, 655 So. 2d 1326 (La. 1995) (unpublished appendix) (potential jurors may be
excused for cause if ability to impose death in case to be tried substantially impaired in light of aggravating circumstances to be presented); Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1264 (Miss. 1996) (four venirepersons properly
excluded for cause because they "probably" could not impose the death penalty when "there were no eyewitnesses or fingerprints linking the defendant to the crime.").
62. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
63. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
64. Id.
65. See supra note 9.
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The decisions in Category VI have considered whether prospective jurors are
challengeable for cause because they would automatically vote for a particular
sentence in light of the mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried. This
category must be divided into subcategories, with Subcategory VI(a) addressing
defense challenges and Subcategory VI(b) addressing prosecution challenges.
No decisions in Subcategory VI(a) have held that the defense may challenge for
cause prospective jurors who, given the mitigating circumstances in the case to
be tried, would automatically vote for the death penalty. Rather, numerous recent
decisions in this subcategory have, however, prohibited the defense from even
seeking to question prospective jurors about their willingness to consider the
individual mitigating circumstances to be presented at the possible capital sentencing phase. 6 Moreover, a number of decisions in this subcategory have held
that the defense may not challenge for cause prospective jurors who are unwilling to consider the mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried. 7 These decisions have held that the sole issue under Morgan is whether the prospective
jurors will vote for a death sentence in every case, and defendants cannot exclude
prospective jurors who will not consider the specific mitigating circumstances in
the case to be tried. For example, in United States v. McCullah, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held:
In Morgan v. Illinois, (citation omitted) the Supreme Court held that a juror who
would automatically vote for the death penalty in every case was not impartial
66. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 E3d 1166, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998) (and cases cited therein); United
States v. McCullah, 76 E3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 879 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Because we conclude that the district court's inquiry into death penalty attitudes was sufficient to cull out any
prospective juror who would always vote for the death penalty whatever the circumstances, we cannot find
error in the court's refusal to conduct or allow further detailed inquiry about specific mitigating factors");
People v. Terrell, 708 N.E.2d 309 (Ill. 1998); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 338 (Miss. 1997) (holding that
the trial court properly sustained the prosecution's objection to the following question by defense counsel to
prospective jurors: "If the defendant was to raise the fact that there was alcohol possibly consumed or alcohol
involved in this case would you rule that out as a mitigating factor prior to passing on the life without parole or
a death penalty"); State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W2d 854 (Mo. 1996); State v. Skipper, 446 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134 (1995); State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ohio 1996) (defendant was not entitled to voir dire prospective jurors about specific mitigating circumstances; "a juror need not give any weight to
any particular mitigating factor although instructed to consider such factors"); State v. Hill, 501 S.E.2d 122
(S.C. 1998).
67. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1277 (Miss. 1994) (only issue under Morgan is whether
veniremen were in favor of death penalty in every case); State v. Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ohio 1990)
("Clearly, jurors cannot be challenged because they do not individually believe in every one of seven statutory
mitigating factors"); Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 508-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (trial courts not
required to exclude for cause potential jurors who will give no weight to specific mitigating circumstances).
Louisiana v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1998) (trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendant's challenge for cause of prospective juror who stated that she would not consider a statutory mitigating circumstance). See also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 744 n.3 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is impossible in
principle to distinguish between a juror who does not believe that any factor can be mitigating from one who
believes that a particularfactor--e.g., 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance'.. .- is not mitigating"; under
the Court's decision in Morgan "a juror who thinks a 'bad childhood' never mitigating must ... be excluded").
But see State v. Cross, 658 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1995) (discussing, but not ruling on defendant's claim that trial
court erred in denying defendant's challenge for cause of prospective juror who would not consider "depression
as a mitigating circumstance").
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because the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors was irrelevant to such
a juror .... The district court was not required, as Mr. McCullah suggests, to
allow inquiry into each juror's views as to the specific mitigating factors as long
as the voir dire was adequate to detect those in the venire who would automatically vote for the death penalty.6"

By contrast, the many decisions in Subcategory VI(b) have held that the prosecution may challenge for cause prospective jurors who are unalterably opposed to
a death sentence because of the mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried.
Despite precedent of the United States Supreme Court stressing that prospective
jurors must be given discretion to accord mitigating circumstances whatever
weight they deem appropriate,6 these decisions have failed even to acknowledge
any difference between prospective jurors who will not vote death because of the

circumstances of the offense and/or the aggravating circumstances in the case to
be tried and prospective jurors who will not vote death because of the mitigating
circumstances in the case. These decisions have merely reasoned that, because
the law does not erect an absolute bar to the death penalty if one or more mitigating circumstances are proven, prospective jurors who are unwilling to impose
death if the mitigating circumstances are proven cannot apply the law.70 Thus, in
Magill v. Dugger, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned:
Florida's sentencing statute provides that age is a mitigating circumstance. It
does not state that a defendant's minority is a complete bar to capital punishment. Consequently, the statute allows for cases in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances balance in favor of imposing the death sentence on a juvenile. Mrs. Bonner indicated, however, that if she faced such a case, she would
68. United States v. McCullah, 76 E3d 1087, 1113-14 (10th Cir. 1996).
69. See supra notes 4, 9, 11, 14.
70. See People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 257 (Cal. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995)
("prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, is therefore subject to challenge for cause...."); People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36, 45
(Cal. 1994) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021 (1995); People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 207 (Colo.
1990):
[A]lthough the juror... may determine what weight to give ... [mitigating] evidence, the juror is
still required to follow the requirements of our statute and weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating circumstances. For a prospective juror to state that in any case involving the
use of alcohol, no matter how little, the juror will not return a death sentence, is to admit that such
juror would not follow the law of this state .... Our legislature has not recognized the use of alcohol, no matter how inconsequential, as an absolute mitigating factor forbidding the imposition of a
death sentence ....
Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 246 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 130 (1997) (prospective juror properly dismissed because he stated that he could not recommend death sentence for the defendant because of his
young age); Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1980), aff'd, Magill v. Dugger, 824 E2d 879, 895-96 (11th
Cir. 1987); Lewis v. State, 268 S.E.2d 915, 921 (Ga. 1980) (Nichols, J., dissenting) (veniremen who cannot
impose death penalty on 16-year-old unable to "'consider all of the penalties provided by state law"').
Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 719 (Miss. 1984) (two prospective jurors properly excluded for cause
because they would not vote for death penalty for 16-year-old regardless of what evidence showed); State v.
Davis, 422 S.E.2d 133, 139 (S.C. 1992) (trial court properly excused for cause prospective juror who "stated
unequivocally during voir dire that she would never impose the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant,
no matter how egregious the crime and how slight the mental retardation"); Garcia v. State, 919 S.W2d 370,
389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (same); State v. Martin, 703 P.2d 309, 312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v.
Comeaux, 514 So. 2d 84, 94 (La. 1987) (same).
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not vote for the death penalty ....Clearly, Mrs. Bonner was unwilling to apply

Florida's criminal statutes as written and therefore she was properly excluded
from appellant's jury.7
Although this reasoning has a surface appeal, it suffers from two logical flaws.
The reasoning proceeds as follows: (1) Witt allows for the exclusion of prospective jurors who are unable to apply the law. (2) The law does not prohibit a death
sentence when a specific mitigating circumstance is proven. (3) Therefore,
prospective jurors who cannot vote for a death sentence when a specific mitigating circumstance is proven cannot apply the law. The reasoning's first flaw is
that it mischaracterizes the very law it seeks to uphold. No state capital punishment scheme in this country precludes (or could preclude under the Eighth
Amendment)" a petit juror from voting against a death sentence because of the
existence of a mitigating circumstance, because jurors are entitled to assign any
weight they deem appropriate to mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, jurors
who will vote for a life sentence after finding a mitigating circumstance are in no
sense unable to apply the law.
This reasoning's second flaw is the one identified in Lewis. If prospective
jurors can be excluded for cause because they will vote for a life sentence if the
defendant proves his mitigating circumstances, then, in the words of the Georgia
Supreme Court, "all veniremen who would consider that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances could be excluded by the state
for cause."73
Decisions in Category VII address challenges for cause of prospective jurors
whose willingness to return a particular sentence is substantially impaired in
light of the mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried. No cases permit
such challenges by the defense. A number of cases, however, permit the prosecution to challenge for cause prospective jurors whose ability to fairly consider a
death sentence is substantially impaired by the mitigating circumstances in the
case to be tried.74 The holdings in these decisions clearly violate the dictates of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even assuming arguendo that states
may properly conclude that prospective jurors can be excused for cause when
trial courts fairly find that they are unalterably opposed to the death penalty if
71. Magill v. Dugger, 824 E2d 879, 896 (11 th Cir. 1987).
72. See supra notes 9, 14.
73. Lewis v. State, 268 S.E.2d 915, 919 (Ga. 1980).
74. See State v. Sparks, 708 P.2d 732, 735 (Ariz. 1985) (prospective juror properly dismissed because of
reservations about imposition of death penalty given the defendant's youth); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703,
712 (La. 1998) (finding that trial court properly excused for cause prospective juror who would give "too
much" weight to mitigating circumstance; "We, like our sister states who have addressed the issue, hold that
when a potential juror indicates his or her attitude regarding the mitigating circumstances would substantially
impair his or her ability to return the death penalty, then the juror is properly excludeable for cause"); State v.
Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 123 (La. 1996) (prospective juror properly dismissed because of reservations about
returning a death sentence when defendant mentally ill); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364 (La. 1996) (unpublished appendix) (holding that prospective jurors can be excused for cause if ability to impose death in case to
be tried substantially impaired in light of mitigating circumstances to be presented); State v. Richardson, 923
S.W2d 301, 309 (Mo. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 403 (1996) (prospective juror properly excused
because of reservations about returning the death penalty given that defendant was an accomplice and was
young); State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 423 (La. 1998) ("when a potential juror indicates during voir dire that he
may afford too much weight to any one particular mitigating circumstance, such that his ability to return the
death penalty would be substantially impaired, then that juror is properly excluded for cause").
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specific mitigating circumstances are proven, states may not exclude for cause
prospective jurors whose willingness to vote for a death sentence will merely be
substantially impaired if the defendant establishes mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances, of course, mitigate against the death penalty.7"
Therefore, mitigating circumstances, if proven, are supposed to inhibit the will-

ingness of a juror to impose a death sentence. And that inhibition may properly
rise to the level of substantial impairment because jurors are free to assign whatever weight they deem appropriate to mitigating circumstances. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that some lower courts have correctly held that the inhibiting

effect of mitigating circumstances may not result in an unalterable opposition to
a death verdict, under the Eighth Amendment, mitigating circumstances must
certainly be allowed to substantially impair jurors' willingness to return a death
sentence. Accordingly, a juror whose willingness to impose a death sentence is

substantially impaired by the existence of one or more mitigating circumstances
is a juror who can readily perform his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath, and therefore cannot be excluded under the Witt standard.7" As stated by the dissent in one of these decisions:
[alithough Rice may have indicated that she might potentially favor a life sentence if presented with mitigating evidence that Tart suffered from a mental
defect, she did not indicate that she would not apply the law... [and] was not
substantially prevented by her views from the "performance of [her] duties as a
juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.""

III. LOWER COURTS HAVE MISINTERPRETED UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS AND HAVE ISSUED OPINIONS THAT PRODUCE JURIES UNCOMMONLY
WILLING TO SENTENCE A PERSON TO DIE.

As the introduction to this Article establishes, the pertinent United States
Supreme Court decisions should be read to hold that the question whether a
prospective juror can be removed for cause during "death/life qualification" voir
dire is to be determined by considering whether the juror's views of capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the juror from following the state's
capital punishment scheme. The issue for the Court has not been whether the
75. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
76. See State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116 (La. 1996) (Lemmon, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Calogero).
77. Id. at 141 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting from denial of application for rehearing) (citations omitted). In
his extraordinary dissent to the denial of Tart's application for rehearing, Chief Justice Calogero of the
Louisiana Supreme Court had the following to say:
What makes this case even more troubling is that it reveals a serious inconsistency in the manner in
which the Court has handled similar issues in death prosecutions depending on whether it is the state
or the defendant which is complaining. The majority in this case rejects Tart's argument that Rice
should not have been excused for cause, for the reason that we should defer to the judgment of the
trial judge who ruled in favor of the state. Yet, quite recently in a case brought here in an interlocutory posture, State v. ShareefCousin, 666 So. 2d 658 (La. 1996), in which the trial judge ruled on a
similar issue in favor of the defendant (the judge refused to excuse for cause on Witherspoon
grounds two potential jurors who were possibly sympathetic to the defense, yet not Witherspoonexcludable) the Court's majority showed no similar respect for the district court's judgment and
overruled him in the midst of the trial.
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prospective juror will consider a life or death sentence under the facts of the case
to be tried.78 Rather, the issue has been whether the prospective juror will
always or almost always vote for a particular penalty regardless of the facts of the
case to be tried. From its first pronouncement on the issue in Witherspoon, in
which the Court stated that "a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in
advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case
before him,"79 to its most recent pronouncement in Morgan, in which the Court
held that "a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless
of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for
cause,"80 the Court has made clear that the inquiry depends on the prospective
jurors' views of capital punishment in the abstract, and not their views of capital
punishment given the facts and circumstances of the case to be tried.
Lower court decisions permitting the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors
who will consider a penalty authorized by the state capital statute only in
"impossible circumstances" may be logically supportable. It is doubtful that
such jurors would be able to fairly consider the penalty. Prospective jurors who
will consider a death sentence only in the most extreme and rare circumstances
will not be able to fairly consider a death sentence. Similarly, prospective jurors
who will consider a life sentence only in the most extreme and rare circumstances will not be able to fairly consider a life sentence.
However, the exclusion of prospective jurors who are willing to fairly consider
a penalty in a variety of circumstances, but perhaps not under the circumstances
of the case to be tried, should not be permitted. The purpose of "death/life
qualification" voir dire is not to try the case. Rather, its purpose is to identify
prospective jurors whose views of capital punishment, whether for or against,
will prevent or substantially impair them from fairly considering the penalties
authorized by the law, regardless of the facts and circumstances that may develop
at trial. In addition, under modem Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, capital
jurors are free to make an individual assessment of the appropriate penalty and to
assign whatever weight they deem appropriate to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.8 1 Prospective jurors who will automatically vote for a death sentence when the aggravating circumstance is a rape are not unable to follow the
law if rape is an aggravating circumstance under the state capital punishment
scheme. 2 Similarly, prospective jurors who will automatically vote for a life
78. See supra notes 27, 28, 29, 31 and accompanying text.
79. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1967).
80. Morgan v. Illinois, 509 U.S. 719 (1992).
81. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 976-80 (1994) (jurors have unfettered discretion to consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate penalty).
82. In his dissent in Morgan, Justice Scalia made a similar point. 509 U.S. at 742-43. He explained that the
defense in that case sought to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty if they found the defendant guilty of a contract killing, correctly pointing out that the contract nature of the
killing was an aggravating factor at the sentencing phase. He also stated that "Illinois law [does not] preclude[ ] a juror from taking a bright-line position that there are no valid reasons why a defendant who has committed a contract killing should not be sentenced to death." Id. at 743. He also stated: "It is important to bear
in mind that the juror who will ignore the requirement of finding an aggravating factor is not an issue here." Id.
at 743 n.l.
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sentence when the defendant was under the influence of alcohol are not unable to
follow the law because, under the Eighth Amendment, alcohol is a mitigating circumstance and jurors are free to assign whatever weight they deem appropriate to
mitigating circumstances. The law directs jurors to a consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances when deciding the appropriate penalty. The
law intends aggravating circumstances to impair jurors' willingness to impose
life sentences, and mitigating circumstances to impair jurors' willingness to
impose death sentences. Therefore, prospective jurors who state that specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances will prevent them from imposing or,
impair their ability to impose, particular penalties are jurors who are capable, not
incapable, of following the law.
Another criticism must be made of these lower court decisions. Although the
United States Supreme Court has appeared to indicate that the Witt inquiry and
the Morgan inquiry are essentially the same and intended to determine the ability
of prospective jurors to follow the law impartially, the trend in lower courts is to
treat the inquiries differently. Recently, lower courts have read Witt expansively
to allow case-specific determinations of challenges for cause by the prosecution,
but they have read Morgan narrowly to preclude case-specific determinations of
challenges for cause by the defense. As demonstrated in the preceding section,
numerous courts have permitted the prosecution to challenge for cause prospective jurors who express reservations about the appropriateness of the death penalty under the facts of the case to be tried, be it because of the aggravating circumstances of the case or the mitigating circumstances of the case. These courts
have reasoned that because the state capital punishment statute authorizes the
death penalty under the facts of the case to be tried, a prospective juror who cannot fairly consider this punishment under those facts is a prospective juror who
is unable to follow the law. However, courts have almost universally refused to
extend that reasoning to defense challenges for cause.
This double standard is truly dismaying and intellectually insupportable. If
prospective jurors can be challenged for cause because they will not consider (or
are substantially impaired in their ability to consider) a death sentence given the
circumstances of the offense, the aggravating circumstances in the case to be
tried and/or mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried, then they certainly
must be excluded for cause if they are unwilling to consider (or are substantially
impaired in their ability to consider) a life sentence given those factors.
Moreover, if case-specific juror exclusion is permitted during death/life qualification, then the defense should be permitted to challenge for cause prospective
jurors who are unable to fairly consider the individual mitigating circumstances
in the case to be tried. The sole justification for this differing treatment would be
that the Court in Morgan spoke only of prospective jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty, while in Witt the Court spoke both of prospective
jurors who would automatically vote for a life sentence and of prospective jurors
whose ability to consider a vote for death was substantially impaired. But as
stated earlier in this Article, the use of this different language does not justify the
double standard. If, as Witt held, prospective jurors are biased and thus challengeable for cause by the prosecution when their ability to consider a vote for
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death is substantially impaired; and if, as Morgan held, a capital defendant is
entitled under the Due Process Clause to impartial jurors, then clearly prospective jurors whose ability to consider a vote for life is substantially impaired are
also biased and must be challengeable for cause by the defense.
This double standard, moreover, leads inevitably to the selection of petit juries
uncommonly willing to sentence a man to die. The appellate decisions discussed
in this Article require trial courts to descend down a slippery slope in which they
must decide whether jurors will have substantial difficulty imposing a death sentence based on the facts of the case to be tried. Prosecutors are permitted during
voir dire to lay out the circumstances of the offense and the aggravating circumstances, and then ask prospective jurors if those circumstances will prevent them
from imposing a death sentence or substantially impair them from doing so. If
prospective jurors say yes, the trial court must grant the prosecutor's challenges
for cause. Prosecutors are then permitted to lay out the defense's mitigating circumstances, and then ask prospective jurors if those mitigating circumstances
will prevent them from imposing a death sentence or substantially impair them
from doing so. Again, if prospective jurors say yes, the trial court must grant the
prosecutor's challenges for cause. Thus, the only prospective jurors who are
qualified to sit on petit juries in death penalty cases are those who are willing,
without any serious reservations, to impose the death penalty given the circumstances of the offense and who might consider the defendant's mitigation, but
will not let that mitigation stand in the way of a death sentence. The case, in
effect, is tried during voir dire, with a death sentence a foregone conclusion. The
result is precisely the pernicious result that the Court sought in Witherspoon to
prevent: the selection in death penalty cases of only jurors "uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die. 83
Furthermore, the trying of death penalty cases during voir dire, and the exclusion of prospective jurors based on their answers to case-specific questions about
their willingness to impose a particular penalty under the facts of the case to be
tried, is on a collision course with itself, particularly if appellate courts end their
double standard and allow the defense to challenge for cause prospective jurors
who are unwilling to vote life under the facts of the case to be tried or are substantially impaired from doing so. Prospective jurors will be challengeable for
cause if their ability to consider either a life sentence or a death sentence is substantially impaired by the circumstances of the offense and/or by the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances of the case to be tried. In other words, virtually all
prospective jurors will be challengeable for cause.
The critical mistake made by lower courts is their conflation of the question
whether prospective jurors can consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances with the question of what weight prospective jurors will assign aggravat83. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521 (1967).
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ing and mitigating circumstances. The parties should be permitted to ask
prospective jurors whether they will fairly consider the aggravating and mitigat-

ing circumstances in the case to be tried. If prospective jurors are unable to fairly consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, then they should be
challengeable for cause. 4 But prospective jurors should not be challengeable for
cause because they indicate they are unwilling to fairly consider a particular
penalty given the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case to be
tried. Prospective jurors must be free to assign whatever weight they deem
appropriate to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to make an individualized assessment of whether the defendant deserves to live or die. Certainly,
substantial reservations about a particular penalty in light of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the case to be tried should not be a ground for a
cause challenge.
IV CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court must address the issues raised by the farragoof wildly conflicting holdings elucidated in this Article, which is resulting in the
exclusion of prospective jurors in death penalty cases on substantially different
legal grounds. Specifically, the Court should state explicitly that the defense can
challenge for cause prospective jurors whose ability to consider a life sentence is
substantially impaired. The Court should also hold that prospective jurors cannot
be excused for cause based on their views of the appropriateness of a particular
penalty under the specific facts of the case to be tried. Clearly, the Court should
put an end to the double standard currently being utilized by lower courts, under
which the prosecution, but not the defense, can challenge for cause prospective
jurors whose ability to consider a particular penalty is substantially impaired, and
under which the prosecution, but not the defense, is permitted to challenge for
cause prospective jurors based on their views of the appropriate punishment
under the facts of the case to be tried. This double standard is a truly distressing
development that is producing the organization of tribunals uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to death.
84. Thus, despite the numerous recent decisions to the contrary, the defense should be permitted to challenge for cause prospective jurors who are unable to fairly consider the individual mitigating circumstances in
the case to be tried. That is not to say, however, that the defense should be permitted to challenge for cause
prospective jurors who are unwilling to accord a specific mitigating circumstance a certain (or indeed any)
weight.

